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Abstract
This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between
a ￿rm and several unions. We address two questions: ￿rst, the optimal
con￿guration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of
the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping
into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same
time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union
con￿guration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process
(monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).
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The degree of centralization of collective bargaining di⁄ers across OECD countries and is
one of the most important features of an industrial relations system. In the U.S., Britain,
Canada and Japan, among others, unions bargain basically at plant level, at ￿rm-wide
level or by industrial sectors. However, in Scandinavian countries, Germany, Austria,
France and Italy, collective bargaining is more centralized. Moreover, in the U.S., unlike
most continental European countries, trade unions have traditionally been very numerous
and have not been linked with political parties. It is worth noting that in recent years
the degree of unionization has fallen notably in the U.S. and Britain, while Scandinavian
countries have experienced considerable increases in their unionization rates.
The literature on unionized labor markets has developed a wide variety of models of
collective bargaining.1 Recently, several studies have been devoted to explaining how
bargaining structures a⁄ect wage and employment determination and in some cases
the bargaining structure preferred by the participants. These studies have focused
mainly on the e⁄ect of centralized ( ￿rms bargain with an industry-wide union) versus
decentralized bargaining structures ( negotiations take place at ￿rm level with independent
unions). Hartog et al. (2002) analyze the ￿rm bargaining regime in the Netherlands, a
corporatist country (a bargaining structure in which there is coordination between union
federations, employer federations and the national govermment); their results suggest
that this feature has small bargaining regime wage e⁄ects. In a bargaining model with
heterogenous workers and two sectors (union and nonunion), Strand (2003) analyzes why
wage dispersion is much greater in countries such as the U.S. and Britain, which have weak
and diminishing unions with limited in￿ uence, than in Scandinavian countries, where
unions are strong and stable. Kiander et al. (2004) study the bargaining regime of 17
OECD countries; their results suggest that the countries where wages are set at ￿rm level
use labor taxes less extensively in ￿nancing welfare spending than those with centralized
1See Oswald (1985) and Farber (1986) for a survey of the most important union models.
2bargaining.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the process of union
formation. We analyze workers￿incentives to group into teams (unions) to bargain with
the ￿rm in di⁄erent institutional environments. Our focus will be on whether workers are
better o⁄ when represented by a single union or by several.2 More precisely, the question
will be posed as follows: When a number of workers face a bargaining game with a ￿rm,
will they group into a single union, into a few unions, or into many? The answer to this
question will depend on the rules of the particular bargaining game determining wage and
employment or, in other words, on the institutional environment in the labor market.
We consider, ￿rst, a bilateral monopoly in the labor market (monopoly union model) in
which unions make a ￿ take-it-or-leave-it￿o⁄er concerning wages and the ￿rm decides on
employment from each union (e.g., Dunlop 1944, and more recently Oswald 1985; Strand
1989; Aronsson et al. 1993; L￿fgren 1993). Then we analyze two solutions involving Nash
bargaining. In the Nash bargaining solution (e.g., MacDonald and Solow, 1981; Barrett
and Pattanaik, 1989; Hart and Moutos, 1991), the ￿rm and the union bargain over wages
and employment and in the right to manage model they bargain only over wages (e.g.,
Nickell and Andrews, 1983; Oswald, 1985; Manning, 1987; Espinosa and Rhee, 1989;
Bughin, 1999; Vannini and Bughin, 2000).3 First we consider that the ￿rm deals with
the di⁄erent unions sequentially, and then we check how simultaneous negotiations could
change the results (e.g., Dobson 1994; Banerji, 2002). For each institutional environment,
we derive the equilibrium wage and employment levels for each union and determine the
optimal number of unions from the workers￿perspective.
Our results indicate that the optimal number of unions depends on the rules of the
negotiation process. We show that under the rules of the monopoly union model workers
2The formation of groups has been the focus of attention of recent literature in game theory. This
analysis has been applied to several economic problems, such as mergers in Cournot markets, partnership
formation and international environmental agreements (e.g., Faul￿-Oller, 1997, Carraro and Siniscalco,
1998; Espinosa and Inarra, 2001; Espinosa and Macho-Stadler, 2003).
3Many empirical studies have tested the appropiate model of trade union behaviour (e.g., Brown and
Ashenfelter, 1986; MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986; De la Rica and Espinosa, 1997).
3have no incentive to form several unions: they will all group into a single union (the ￿rm
however, would rather have them dispersed into several groups). Nevertheless, when the
￿rm and unions bargain ￿ la Nash to decide on wages and employment, workers are better
o⁄if they organize into small unions (and the ￿rm would rather deal with a single union).
We also analyze the right to manage model and show that both the ￿rm and the workers
would rather have two unions than one.
Labor heterogeneity may be a reason for workers to group into several unions. Byoung
Heon Jun (1989) analyzes union formation in a model where workers with di⁄erent
productivity levels may decide to form either a joint union or two separate unions; workers
form a joint union when the productivity levels and sizes of the groups are similar.
Horn and Wolinsky (1988) show the relationship between the equilibrium pattern of
unionization and the degree of substitutability between two types of labor; workers tend to
form a single union when the two types are substitutes. In this paper we will assume labor
homogeneity to highlight the impact of bargaining rules on the incentives to group into
unions. With homogeneous workers our results indicate that dividing into several unions
allows workers to price discriminate and extract a higher surplus from the ￿rm, but at
the same time it decreases their supply-side market power. We ￿nd that in the sequential
monopoly union model the market power e⁄ect dominates, while in the sequential Nash
bargaining model the wage discrimination e⁄ect is more important.
Previous literature has developed di⁄erent models to analyze union con￿guration. In
a model with two groups of workers which are perfect substitutes and where variables are
negotiated sequentially, Manning (1987b) obtains that workers would prefer to centralize
negotiations (the two unions join forces to bargain with the ￿rm). In a right-to-manage
model where bargaining takes place between two ￿rms and a union, Dobson (1994)
considers whether the union would prefer to deal with the ￿rms simultaneously or
sequentially. Based on Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Naylor (1995) o⁄ers an explanation
for the empirical observation that ￿rms with several unions and independent bargaining
4agreements have higher wages than those with a single union.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and in
Sections 3, 4 and 5 we study the optimal con￿guration of unions under the rules of
the monopoly union model, Nash bargaining and right to manage, respectively. Some
extensions of the model are suggested in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
In this section we develop a model of union formation in institutional environments where
wages and employment are the outcome of sequential bargaining between a ￿rm and
several unions.
As in Dobson (1994), there is a rule of order among the unions, and the ￿rm bargains
with them sequentially following this rule. Sequential bargaining introduces an asymmetry
between unions which are otherwise identical; when bargaining is sequential, agreements
reached previously may a⁄ect current negotiations. First, we explore the consequences of
this asymmetry and in Section 5 we solve the model for simultaneous bargaining.
Unions are assumed to be ex-ante identical, that is, with the same number of members,
m, and the same objective function; we assume there is a minimum number of members
m. Moreover, we will assume, as in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), that unions do not care
about other unions￿members, and that they behave independently without cooperating
with one another.
2.1. Objective function of unions
We assume each union maximizes a representative member￿ s expected utility function.5
All workers are identical. Denoting by m the size of union membership (number of
members), l the union￿ s employment level (number of employed members), w the wage
4In recent years several articles have addressed the problem of how to determine and explain union
membership (e.g., Moreton, D.R., 1998; Naylor, R. and Cripps, M., 1993; Askildsen, et al. 2002).
5An alternative speci￿cation could be a Stone-Geary utility function or some other quasi-concave
function. See Oswald (1985) for an overview of di⁄erent union utility functions.





We normalize u(S) = 0 and assume workers are risk neutral, so that u(w) = w. With
T unions, the objective function of union i can be expressed as:
￿i(wi;li) = wili i : 1;2;:::;T (1)
where wi and li are the wage and the employment of union i.
Our interest in this paper is to determine whether workers would prefer to organize in
a single union or in several. Our optimality criterion will be the sum of all workers￿utility,
although we will also look at the distribution among workers. The expected utility of a
worker in union i is
wili
mi . There are mi members, so the sum of utilities is wili. Adding








This expression will be referred to as total union utility. The union con￿guration
maximizing total union utility will be considered optimal from the workers￿point of view.
2.2. Objective function of ￿rms
We ignore other inputs and consider that the ￿rm maximizes revenue minus labor costs.
Thus, when the ￿rm bargains with T unions, its objective is to maximize:
￿T(w;l) = R(LT) ￿
T P
i=1
wili i : 1;2;:::;T
where w = (w0;w1;::::wT), l = (l0;l1;::::lT), w0 ￿ 0, l0 ￿ 0, LT =
T P
i=1
li, R(LT) is the
revenue function and the labor demand function is linear.
To simplify the analysis it is assumed that the ￿rm is a price-taker in the product
market, selling at a price p; f(LT) = (zLT ￿L2
T), where z is a productivity parameter, is
6See Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
6the production function. Note that R(0) = 0, and that R(LT) = pf(LT) is increasing for
LT < z
2 , and concave. With this speci￿cation, the ￿rm￿ s objective function is given by:




wili i : 1;2;:::;T (2)
3. Sequential monopoly union model
We ￿rst study union formation in an environment where a union makes a ￿ take-it-or-
leave-it￿wage announcement at each stage and the ￿rm decides the employment level for
that union. The rules of this wage and employment determination process resemble those
of the monopoly union model at each stage of the negotiation process, so we term these
rules sequential monopoly union model.
We assume that there are T unions, and a rule establishing the order in which
unions can make wage o⁄ers. Each union i will take into account the result of previous
negotiations and its o⁄er wi will be a function of (l0;::::;li￿1). The timing of the
game is as follows. At each stage i, the union sets wi (l0;::::;li￿1) and then the ￿rm
determines li(wi;l0;:::;li￿1). We solve the game backwards to calculate the subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Stage T:
At this stage the wage and employment level for union T are decided. Since the ￿rm
has already reached agrements with T ￿1 unions, the wages and employment levels agreed
upon with other unions will have an in￿ uence on the current negotiations.
We compute the ￿rm￿ s best response, lT(wT;l0;::;lT￿1), to the wage announcement by
union T. The ￿rm solves:
MaxlT￿0 ￿T(w;l)








Union T announces wT, taking into account previous negotiations. To determine the
optimal wage, wT; union T solves:
MaxwT￿0 ￿T(wT;lT)
s.t. (3)








From (3) and (4) we have that the employment level for union T as a function of











Once wage wi has been announced, the ￿rm decides li. Thus, the ￿rm solves the
following problem:
Maxli￿0 ￿T(w;l)
s.t. wj(l0;.::;li) j : (i + 1);(i + 2);:::;T
lj(l0;.::;li)








Union i announces wi. To determine the optimal wage, wi, union i solves:
8Maxwi￿0 ￿i(wi;li)
s.t. (6)





















Table 1 collects the equilibrium results for this negotiation process. There is a
relationship between equilibrium levels and the number of unions, T, and also between an
individual union￿ s utility and the order of that union in the negotiations. We summarize
these results as follows.
(a) Total union utility decreases in the number of unions, T.
(b) For the ￿rm, equilibrium pro￿ts are increasing in T.
(c) Both e¢ ciency (as measured by total union utility plus pro￿ts) and total employment
increase with the number of unions, T.
(d) Utility for union i is negatively related to the total number of unions, T, and lower the
later it bargains with the ￿rm in the sequential game.
(e) Employment level for union i is independent of the total number of unions but lower
the later it bargains with the ￿rm in the sequential game.
(f) The wage for union i is negatively related both to the number of unions, T, and to its
index or position in the sequential process, i.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
9As total union utility decreases with the number of unions, T; workers have incentives
to group into a single union. However, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are negatively related to T, so
the ￿rm would prefer to deal with small unions.7
When T increases only the ￿rm bene￿ts from the increase in e¢ ciency. It is also worth
noting that the slope of the inverse labor demand function faced by union 1 is lower (in
absolute terms) the higher the number of unions, T. The intuition behind these results
is that as T increases the market gets closer to a competitive labor market (at the limit,
market power on the supply side disappears), so e¢ ciency improves, but the side of the
market that loses market power is worse o⁄.8
Total employment increases with the number of unions, T, but each union￿ s
employment level is not a⁄ected by T. When T increases, total employment increases
by the same amount as new unions￿employment. However, although the employment
levels of the previous unions do not change, their wage levels decrease when T increases.
In Figure 1 we show how the di⁄erent variables move with T.
On the other hand, one might wonder why the ￿rm hires less workers from those
unions (the last ones) that have lower wages. The reason is that employment at the early
stages a⁄ects the wage at the later ones, so the higher the number of workers hired from
the ￿rst unions the lower the wages of the last ones.
4. Sequential Nash bargaining solution
In this section we study union formation in an environment where the ￿rm and unions
bargain over wage and employment.9 We term the rules of this wage and employment
determination process sequential Nash bargaining solution.
In this case, at each stage i the ￿rm and union i solve the following problem:
7Note that workers are indi⁄erent between one and two unions, but with a small ￿xed cost of
constituting a union we can break this tie.
8We can check how as T increases ￿T is closer to the result that we are going to obtain in the Nash
bargaining model, ￿T = 1
4pz2:
9See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).
10Maxwi; li (￿i ￿ ￿c
i)￿(￿T ￿ ￿c
T)1￿￿ i : 1;2;:::;T
s.t. wj(l0;.::;li) j : (i + 1);(i + 2);:::;T
lj(l0;.::;li)
where: ￿i is the union￿ s objective function as de￿ned in Section 2.1, ￿c
i is union i￿ s
disagreement point, ￿c
T is the ￿rm￿ s disagreement point, ￿ is unions￿bargaining power,
and (1 ￿ ￿) is the ￿rm￿ s bargaining power, with 0 < ￿ < 1.
As unions behave independently we have that ￿c
i = 0 (i : 1;:::T). Moreover, we assume
that ￿c
T = 0 (i : 1;:::T), i.e. we assume the ￿rm has to negotiate with all unions.10 The
negotiation process does not proceed to stage i + 1, and previous agreements are not
e⁄ective, until an agreement with union i has been reached. Therefore, pro￿ts as well as
workers￿incomes are zero at the disagreement point. This assumption is made to isolate
what we call the ￿ price discrimination￿e⁄ect that appears when there is more than one
union. In section 5 we also consider the case in which the ￿rm is not forced to bargain
with all unions, and therefore, ￿c
T is endogenously determined.
Solving the game
We solve the game backwards to calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Stage T:
At this stage, the ￿rm and union T solve the following problem:
MaxwT; lT (￿T)￿(￿T)1￿￿ 0 < ￿ < 1
From the ￿rst order conditions we obtain the wage and employment level for union T




























At this stage the ￿rm negotiates with union i and both parties simultaneously
determine (wi;li), once the ￿rm has reached agreements with unions 1;:::(i ￿ 1), and
therefore, once the wages and employment levels of these unions have already been set.
Denote (w;l)
T
i+1 the equilibrium values in periods i+1;::::;T. The ￿rm and union i solve:













￿ li ￿ m
￿ (11)
with i : 1;2;:::(T ￿ 1)
This outcome implies that there is a continuum of equilibrium solutions at each stage
i: all those combinations [wi; li] that satisfy (11). This is because the ￿rm and union i
are indi⁄erent between these combinations. This indi⁄erence is obvious in the case of the
union. For the ￿rm, it comes from the in￿ uence that present negotiations have on later
wages and employment. According to (9) and (10), a lower wi and a higher li (which
would increase pro￿ts at stage i without decreasing union i0s utility level) imply a higher
wT and a lower lT, decreasing pro￿ts at stage T. The result of this trade-o⁄ is that the
￿rm is indi⁄erent between combinations [wi; li] that satisfy (11). This indi⁄erence does
not hold at stage T since [wT; lT] do not a⁄ect any future negotiations.
12Table 2 shows the equilibrium results for this sequential negotiation process between
a ￿rm and several unions. There is a relationship between equilibrium levels and the
number of unions, T, and also between an individual union￿ s utility and the order of that
union in the negotiations, i.
Next, we summarize these results.
(a) Total union utility is increasing in unions￿bargaining power, ￿, and positively related
to the total number of unions, T.
(b) Pro￿ts are negatively related to the unions￿ bargaining power, ￿; and to the total
number of unions, T.
(c) Neither total welfare nor total employment depends on the total number of unions, T,
or on the unions￿bargaining power, ￿.
(d) Utility for union i does not depend on the number of unions but it is negatively related
to the order of that union in the sequential bargaining. Moreover, the greater the unions￿
bargaining power the lower
ui
ui￿1. The e⁄ect of ￿ on individual union￿ s utility is:
For i = 1
@ui
@￿ > 0 if 0 < ￿ < 1
For i > 1
@ui
@￿ > 0 if 0 < ￿ < 1
i
@ui
@￿ < 0 if 1
i < ￿ < 1
@2ui
@￿2 < 0 if 1
i < ￿ < 2
i
@2ui
@￿2 > 0 if 2
i < ￿ < 1
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Thus, in this case, as total union utility is increasing with the total number of unions,
T, workers have incentives to group into several unions of the minimum size m. However,
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are negatively related to T, so the ￿rm would prefer to deal with a single
union.
Note that e¢ ciency, as measured by total welfare obtained from sequential negotiations
between the ￿rm and unions, is a⁄ected neither by the number of unions nor by unions￿
13bargaining power. This result comes from the e¢ ciency of the Nash bargaining solution.
The question is how total welfare is shared between the parties. In this case, we can see
that the surplus that unions are able to obtain from the ￿rm increases with the number of
unions. The intuition behind this result is that when there are several unions they behave
as a price discriminating seller. This price discrimination e⁄ect drives the main result in
this section: it would be optimal for the workers to group themselves into small unions.
The e⁄ect of ￿ on an individual union￿ s utility is di⁄erent for each union i. Utility for
the ￿rst union is always increasing in ￿ while for the rest of the unions it is increasing
or independent of the value of ￿. For a given union, an increase in ￿ implies not only an
increase in its own bargaining power, but also in other unions￿bargaining power, which
makes the e⁄ect on union i￿ s utility ambiguous. In Figure 2 we show how the di⁄erent
variables move with T.
If we compare the results on the optimal con￿guration of unions that we have obtained
in each institutional environment (that is, under the rules of the monopoly union model
and under the rules of the Nash bargaining), we see that the optimal number of unions
depends on the rules of the negotiation process. This result is collected in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. (a) In the sequential monopoly union model, the optimal union
con￿guration is given by a single union, while in the Nash bargaining model it is given by
a number of small unions of size m.
(b) In the sequential monopoly union model, the ￿rm would like to deal with unions of size
m, while in the sequential Nash bargaining model, it would like the workers to organize in
a single union.
(c) In the sequential monopoly union model, both total welfare and total employment are
positively related to the number of unions, T, while in the sequential Nash bargaining
model neither of them depends on T.
For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which,
14at the same time, decreases their supply side market power. Proposition 1 states that for
the Nash bargaining model the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates while in the sequential monopoly
model the second e⁄ect is stronger.
5. Sequential Right to Manage Model
In the sequential right to manage model, at each stage i the ￿rm and the union bargain
over the wage wi. Then the ￿rm decides on employment from that union i. Thus, union










j denote equilibrium values of the corresponding variables. As in
the previous section, we assume that the disagreement point yields zero payo⁄s.
In contrast to the standard right to manage model, in the sequential version the ￿rm
does not decide li according to the static labor demand schedule; rather, it takes into
account the e⁄ect of li on all later wages wj (j = i + 1;:::;T) and solves:
Maxli ￿T(w;l)
s.t. w￿
j j = i + 1;:::T
The sequential right to manage model is di¢ cult to solve and we cannot get explicit
solutions for (wi;li) at each stage. Therefore, we solve the case of T = 2 and compare the
outcome to the equilibrium outcome with only one union.
Table 3 presents the equilibrium results for parameter values ￿ = 1=2, p = 1, z = 1,
and two unions.
Table 4 compares the outcome with two unions and a single union and contains the
main result of this section. In contrast with the two previous models, here the ￿rm and
the workers agree on the best con￿guration: they would rather have two unions instead
of one.
15Total welfare is higher when T = 2 since employment is higher. This increase in
total e¢ ciency is shared by the ￿rm and the unions. The ￿rm bene￿ts from lower wages.
Despite the lower wages when T = 2, the unions enjoy higher utility due to the higher
employment.
6. Extensions
In this section we present several extensions; ￿rst, we check how simultaneous negotiations
can change the above results; and second, we extent the analysis to the Nash bargaining
solution with a disagreement point yielding positive pro￿ts to the ￿rm.
6.1. Simultaneous game
Assume that instead of negotiating with each union in a sequential manner the ￿rm
negotiates simultaneously with all unions.
First, we analyze simultaneous negotiations in an environment characterized by the
rules of the Nash bargaining.
The timing of the simultaneous Nash bargaining model is given by a single stage at
which the problem to be solved by the ￿rm and unions is the following:11
Maxwi; li (￿T)1￿￿(￿i)￿ i : 1;2;:::;T
0 < ￿ < 1
The results for this case are collected in Table 5. It can be checked that:
(a) Total union utility increases with the number of unions, T.
(b) Pro￿ts for the ￿rm decrease with the number of unions, T.
(c) Neither total employment nor total welfare depends on the total number of unions or
on the parties￿bargaining power.
11Note that we assume the ￿rm has to reach an agreement with all unions for the agreements to be
e⁄ective.
16(d) Given T, all unions obtain the same individual utility level. Moreover, utility for
union i is lower the higher the number of unions at the ￿rm, T.
In this case, when the ￿rm negotiates simultaneously with all unions, as in the case
of sequential negotiation, total union utility increases in the number of unions, T, so
workers have incentives to group into several unions of the minimum size. However, as
pro￿ts decrease in T, the ￿rm would prefer workers to group into a single union.
Unlike the result obtained in the sequential Nash bargaining model, all unions obtain
the same individual utility level, since there is no asymmetry between unions in this case.
Moreover, although total union utility increases in T, individual utility is decreasing in
T.
If the rules of the game were those of the monopoly union model, as in the case of
sequential negotiation, the optimal con￿guration of unions would be given by a single
union. In the case of the simultaneous monopoly union model, unions compete ￿ la
Bertrand: if a union reduces its wage slightly with regard to the lowest wage announced,
it will be the ￿rst to attract the labor demand of the ￿rm; unions would go on reducing
their wage demand to a wage level wR, which we could identify as the workers￿reservation
wage or competitive wage level. Thus, the equilibrium wages would be given by:
wi = wR 8 i : 1;2;::;T and 8 T > 1
This equilibrium wage, for any number of unions T > 1, is always lower than it would
be in the case of a single union (the monopoly union model). Thus, the equilibrium
outcome in the monopoly union model (one union) always gives workers a higher utility
level than the one obtained when there are several unions.
In the case of the simultaneous right to manage model, the ￿rm and each union solve
Maxwi (￿T)1￿￿(￿i)￿
17As in the sequential case, the simultaneous right to manage model is di¢ cult to solve
and we cannot get explicit solutions for (wi;li) at each stage. Therefore, we solve the
cases for T = 2 and T = 3. The result is shown in Table 6.
Unlike the result obtained in the sequential negotiation, in this case total union utility
decreases with the number of unions, T, so workers have no incentive to group into several
unions. However, as pro￿ts increase in T, the ￿rm would prefer workers to group into
di⁄erent unions. Total employment and welfare increase with the number of unions.
Moreover, when the ￿rm negotiates simultaneously with all unions, each obtains the same
individual utility level, since there is no asymmetry between unions in this case.
6.2. Disagreement point
In this second extension, we look again at the sequential Nash bargaining model taking
into account that a ￿rm may decide not to bargain with a particular union, and then
its pro￿ts would not be zero but the pro￿ts that come from negotiations with the other
unions, so:
￿c
T > 0 8 T
6.2.1. Sequential negotiation
In this case, the ￿rm and union i solve the following problem at each stage i of the
sequential negotiation process:
Maxwi; li (￿i)￿(￿T ￿ ￿c)1￿￿ i : 1;2;:::;T
s.t. wj(l0;.::;li) j : (i + 1);(i + 2);:::;T
lj(l0;.::;li)
First, we solve the model for any disagreement point, ￿c, and later on we check the
case of an endogenous disagreement point.
A disagreement point ￿c independent of the number of unions
The timing of the negotiation process between the ￿rm and unions is the same as in
18Section 4. We solve the game backwards to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium. Table
7 shows the results, which can be summarized as follows:
(a) The higher the ￿rm￿ s disagreement point the lower both individual union utility and
total union utility. This e⁄ect reinforces the position of the ￿rm in the negotiation process
increasing its pro￿ts.
(b) Neither total employment nor total welfare depends on the total number of unions;
moreover, neither of them depends on unions￿bargaining power or the ￿rm￿ s disagreement
point.
(c) Utility for union i is lower the higher the index of the union. The higher the unions￿
bargaining power the lower
ui
ui￿1.
If we compare these results with those obtained in the Nash bargaining model in
Section 4, that is, when the ￿rm￿ s disagreement point was zero, we obtain:
ud
i = und
i ￿ ￿c[(1 ￿ ￿)i￿1￿] 8 i
Ud
T = Und
T ￿ ￿c[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T] 8 T
￿d
T = ￿nd









where nd denotes the results obtained when ￿c = 0 (Table 2), and d those obtained
in this case, with a disagreement point independent of the number of unions.
With a disagreement point ￿c independent of the number of unions the result is the
same as with a zero disagreement point, that is, workers have incentives to group into
several unions while the ￿rm would prefer workers to group into a single union.
An endogenous disagreement point ￿c
T
Note that the ￿rm￿ s disagreement point is likely to depend on the total number of
unions at the ￿rm, T. The disagreement point, that is, the pro￿t obtained by the ￿rm if
19it does not reach an agreement with a union, is the pro￿t obtained by the ￿rm when it
negotiates with the rest of the unions, that is:
￿c
T = 0 T = 1
￿c
T = ￿T￿1 T : 2;3;:::











@￿ < 0, for 0 < ￿ < 1
The timing of the negotiation process is the same as in the previous section. Taking
into account that we are now dealing with an endogenous disagreement point, ￿c
T = ￿T￿1,
we solve the game backwards to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium.
The results derived from the sequential bargaining process as a function of the total
number of unions at the ￿rm are shown in Table 8.
Next, we summarize those results.
(a) Total union utility is lower the higher the total number of unions, T, and higher, the
higher the unions￿bargaining power, ￿.
(b) The ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts increase with the number of unions, T, and decrease with unions￿
bargaining power, ￿.
(c) Utility for union i decreases with the total number of unions and with the union￿ s
index. The e⁄ect of unions￿bargaining power on each union￿ s individual utility level is:
For i = 1
@ui
@￿ > 0 if 0 < ￿ < 1
For i > 1
@ui
@￿ > 0 if 0 < ￿ < Zi
@ui
@￿ < 0 if Zi < ￿ < 1
where Zi is the positive root, 0 < Zi < 1, that solves the equation ￿2A￿￿[iB+A]+B =
0, with A =
@￿c
T
@￿ and B = (￿ ￿ ￿c
T).
20The proof can be found in Appendix C.
Thus, total union utility is lower the higher the number of unions at the ￿rm, for any
value of unions￿bargaining power (although the higher ￿, the higher total union utility).
This is beacuse the ￿rm￿ s disagreement point is positive and increasing in T, so the higher
the number of unions the better the position of the ￿rm to carry out negotiation (if it does
not reach an agreement with one union, it still has the possibility of reaching agreements
with the rest). In contrast to previous cases of Nash bargaining, here workers￿market
power loss when they break up into several unions dominates the price discrimination
e⁄ect.
The e⁄ect of unions￿bargaining power on each union￿ s utility level is di⁄erent as a
function of the index of the union (except the ￿rst one, whose utility always increases in
￿). In fact, for each union i there is a value of ￿, Zi, for which its utility is maximized,
when ￿ > Zi utility for union i is negatively related to ￿ and when ￿ < Zi it is positively
related to ￿. The di⁄erent e⁄ect of ￿ on unions￿individual utility is due to sequential
negotiations. Note also Zi depends on the number of unions (unlike the result obtained in
the Nash bargaining model in Section 4, with zero disagreement point). More precisely,
Zi decreases with the number of unions, T and given T, with the index of the union.
If we compare these results with those obtained in Section 4, we can check how in
this case the range of values of ￿ for which each union￿ s individual utility increases has
broadened (see Figure 3). This is due to a stronger position of the ￿rm in the negotiation
process: the ￿rst unions that take part in the sequential process cannot extract as much
surplus from the ￿rm as they could in the Nash bargaining model with zero disagreement
point.
6.2.2. Simultaneous game
The timing of the game is given by a single stage at which the problem to be solved by
the ￿rm and unions is the following:
21Maxwi; li (￿T ￿ ￿￿)1￿￿(￿i)￿ i : 1;2;:::;T
0 < ￿ < 1
where ￿￿ = ￿T￿1
The results when ￿￿ does not depend on the number of unions, T, can be found in
Table 10. The conclusions are the same as with a zero disagreement point. Table 9 shows
the results with an endogenous disagreement point:
(a) Total union utility decreases with the number of unions, T.
(b) Firm￿ s pro￿ts increase with the total number of unions, T.
(c) Neither total employment nor total welfare depends on the total number of unions or
on the parties￿bargaining power.
(d) Given a number of unions at the ￿rm, T, all unions obtain the same individual utility
level. Moreover, individual utility decreases with the number of unions.
The proof is relegated to Appendix D.
Thus, in this case, as total union utility decreases with the number of unions, T,
workers have incentives to group into a single union. However, pro￿ts increase with T, so
the ￿rm would prefer workers to group into several unions of the minimum size.
We show the main result of this second extension in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In an environment characterized by the rules of Nash bargaining with an
endogenous disagreement point, the optimal con￿guration of unions is given by a single
union, while the ￿rm would prefer to deal with several unions of the minimum size:
Making the ￿rm￿ s disagreement point endogenous has such a strong impact on the
workers￿market power that this e⁄ect always dominates the price discrimination e⁄ect.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper focuses on the optimal con￿guration of unions, from the workers￿perspective,
when bargaining takes place at ￿rm level and there are several unions. We perform this
22analysis for di⁄erent institutional environments (rules of the negotiation process), and
patterns of bargaining (simultaneous or sequential). It turns out that the rules of the
negotiation process make a di⁄erence, and whether workers prefer to organize in big or
small unions depends on those rules.
In the sequential monopoly union model workers have incentives to constitute a single
union to bargain with the ￿rm, while in the Nash bargaining model workers are grouped
into small unions. We identify two e⁄ects: a wage discrimination e⁄ect and a market power
e⁄ect. Dividing into several unions allows workers to price discriminate and to extract a
higher surplus from the ￿rm, but at the same time, it decreases their supply-side market
power. We ￿nd that in the sequential monopoly union model the market power e⁄ect
dominates, while in the sequential Nash bargaining model the wage discrimination e⁄ect
is more important. The terms of the trade-o⁄ between the two e⁄ects are the same also
when negotiations are simultaneous.
In the case of the Nash bargaining model, when we consider an endogenous
disagreement point the result changes. In this case, workers would prefer to constitute a
single union (with sequential negotiations as well as with simultaneous negotiations).
In this paper we analyze workers￿incentives to form big or small unions. A￿ possible
next step is to formalize the question of endogenous union formation, with explicit rules
for the process by which workers decide to group into unions. We leave this analysis for
further research.
23Appendix A: Sequential Monopoly Union Model





22T+1pz2 T : 1;2;::::::
j : 1;2;:::;T




4T+1 < 0 8 T > 1
Total union utility with T unions as a function of total union utility with T ￿ 1
























Pro￿ts with T unions as a function of pro￿ts with T ￿ 1 unions are given by:
￿T = ￿T￿1 + 43￿T3T￿1
256 pz2













￿T+1 (ln4)pz2 > 0 8 T
Total welfare with T unions as a function of total welfare with T ￿1 unions can
be expressed as:
￿T = ￿T￿1 + 43￿T3
256 pz2











Total employment with T unions as a function of total employment with T ￿ 1





(d) The equilibrium outcomes for union i as a function of the levels obtained by







Utility for union i as a function of the number of unions can be expressed as:
ui = 3T￿i






2 pz2 < 0
@ui
@i = ￿3T￿i ln3
22T+1 pz2 < 0
(e) The employment level for union i is given by:
li = 2T￿i
2T+1z i : 1;2;:::;T
and then:
@li
@T = (2T￿i ln2)2T+1￿(2T+1 ln2)2T￿i
(2T+1)
2 z = 0
@li
@i = ￿2T￿i ln2
2T+1 z < 0
(f) The wage for union i as a function of the total number of unions is given by:
wi = 3T￿i2i￿1
22T￿1 pz i : 1;2;:::;T









22T￿1 pz < 0
25Appendix B: Sequential Nash bargaining model
(a) Total union utility is given by:
UT = ￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T￿
T : 1;2;:::











￿(1 ￿ ￿)T ln(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
> 0
(b) The ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are given by:
￿T = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)T T : 1;2;:::











(1 ￿ ￿)T ln(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
< 0
￿T as a function of pro￿ts with (T ￿ 1) unions can be expressed as:
￿T = ￿T￿1(1 ￿ ￿) T : 2;3;:::
0 < ￿ < 1
(c) Total welfare and total employment as a function of the number of unions
are given by:
￿T = ￿ = 1
4pz2 8 T; ￿
LT = 1
2z 8 T; ￿
(d) Utility for union i as a function of the level obtained by the previous one
can be expressed as:
ui = ui￿1(1 ￿ ￿) i : 2;:::;T
0 < ￿ < 1
Utility for union i as a function of the number of unions is given by:
ui = 1
4pz2(1 ￿ ￿)i￿1￿ i : 1;2;:::;T






4pz2(1 ￿ ￿)i￿1￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿) < 0
The e⁄ect of ￿ on an individual union￿ s utility is:
For i = 1
@ui
@￿ > 0 if 0 < ￿ < 1
For i > 1
@ui
@￿ > 0 if 0 < ￿ < 1
i
@ui
@￿ < 0 if 1
i < ￿ < 1
@2ui
@￿2 < 0 if 1
i < ￿ < 2
i
@2ui
@￿2 > 0 if 2
i < ￿ < 1
There is a value of ￿, ￿ = 1=i (which is higher the lower the index of the union) that
maximizes utility for union i, so when ￿ < 1=i; union i￿ s individual utility is positively
related to the unions￿bargaining power, and when ￿ > 1=i; utility for union i is decreasing
in ￿; although total union utility is always increasing in ￿. Also, it can be checked that
when ￿ > 2=i, the negative e⁄ect of a rise in ￿ is smaller; the reason is that the higher the
unions￿bargaining power is, the higher the ￿rm￿ s surplus that the ￿rst unions (particularly
the ￿rst one) can extract, and therefore the lower the ￿rm￿ s surplus to bargain for at the
last stages of the sequential bargaining process. Thus, the higher the index of the union
the higher the range of values of ￿ for which an increase of ￿ has a negative e⁄ect on its
utility. In the case of union 2, for example, the optimal situation would be that in which
the ￿rm and unions have the same bargaining power. Nevertheless, for the rest of the
unions (except the ￿rst one), it would be better to have a lower bargaining power than
the ￿rm.
27Appendix C: Sequential Nash bargaining solution
An endogenous disagreement point ￿c
T




[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)i] T : 1;2;:::
0 < ￿ < 1




















[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)i]
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)k￿1k > 0
(b) As e¢ ciency or total welfare does not depend on the number of unions and







[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)i]
￿
T : 1;2;:::



















[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)i]
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)k￿1k < 0
(c) Individual utility for union i is:
ui = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)i￿1[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T￿1]￿T￿1 T > 1
0 < ￿ < 1
It can be checked that:
@ui














< 0 8 i
Utility for union i as a function of the level obtained by the previous union is
given by:
28ui = ui￿1(1 ￿ ￿) i : 2;:::;T
0 < ￿ < 1
The e⁄ect of unions￿bargaining power on each union￿ s individual utility level is:
For i = 1
@ui
@￿ > 0 ) 0 < ￿ < 1
For i > 1
@ui
@￿ > 0 ) 0 < ￿ < Zi
@ui
@￿ < 0 ) Zi < ￿ < 1
where Zi is the positive root, 0 < Zi < 1, that solves the equation ￿2A￿￿[iB +
A] + B = 0, with A =
@￿c
T
@￿ and B = (￿ ￿ ￿c
T).
We can check that:
@Zi
@T < 0 i > 1
@Zi
@i < 0 i > 1
With two and three unions at the ￿rm, we obtain the following results:
T = 2 T = 3
i = 2
@ui
@￿ > 0 ) 0 < ￿ < 2
3 0 < ￿ < 0;710
@ui
@￿ < 0 ) 2
3 < ￿ < 1 0;710 < ￿ < 1
@2ui
@￿2 > 0 ) 0 < ￿ < 1
3 0 < ￿ < 0;44
@2ui
@￿2 < 0 ) 1
3 < ￿ < 1 0;44 < ￿ < 1
i = 3
@ui
@￿ > 0 ) - 0 < ￿ < 0;5657
@ui
@￿ < 0 ) - 0;5657 < ￿ < 1
29Appendix D: Simultaneous Nash bargaining model
An endogenous disagreement point ￿￿









(j￿1)￿+1 j : 1;2;::;T
Because of 0 < Gj(￿) < 1, we get that :
@UT
@T < 0 8 T; ￿
Total union utility with T unions as a function of total union utility with (T ￿1)






0 < ￿ < 1
T : 1;2;:::
We can check that total union utility increases with unions￿bargaining power:
@UT

















(￿j￿￿+1)2 > 0 8 j
(b) The ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are given as follows:








@T > 0 8 T; ￿
@￿T
@￿ < 0
(d) Utility obtained by each union as a function of the number of unions at the






j￿+1 8 i : 1;2;::;T
Denoting Fj(￿) =
j￿
j￿+1 j : 1;2;::;T ￿ 1
Because of 0 < ￿ < 1, and therefore 0 < Fj(￿) < 1, we get:
30@ui
@T < 0 8 T; i
It can be checked that, for all i, the individual utility level is always increasing


























[j￿+1]2 > 0 8 j






0 < ￿ < 1
Thus: (ui)T < (ui)T￿1
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35Table 1
Results for the sequential monopoly union model





































wT ￿ ￿ ￿ 2T￿1
22T￿1pz
lT ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
2T+1z
uT ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
22T+1pz2
36Table 2
Results for the Sequential Nash bargaining model




4pz2(2 ￿ ￿)￿ 1
4pz2(3 ￿ 3￿ + ￿2)￿ 1
4pz2[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T]
￿T
1
4pz2(1 ￿ ￿) 1
4pz2(￿1 + ￿)2 ￿1





















4pz2(1 ￿ ￿)￿ 1
4pz2(1 ￿ ￿)￿ 1
4pz2(1 ￿ ￿)￿
u3 ￿ ￿ 1
4pz2(￿ ￿ 1)2￿ 1
4pz2(￿ ￿ 1)2￿
uT ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
4pz2(1 ￿ ￿)T￿1￿
37Table 3
Sequential Right to Manage with two unions (￿ = 1=2;p = z = 1)
Union 1 Union 2 Total
Wage 0;24 0;15 0;222
Employment 0;34 0;085 0;425
Utility 0;0816 0;01275 0;09435
Pro￿t - - 0;150025
Welfare - - 0;244375
38Table 4
Sequential Right to Manage Model (￿ = 1=2;p = z = 1)
Single union Two unions
Weighted average wage wm 0,25 0,222
Total employment LT 0,375 0,425
Utility ￿T 0,09375 0,09435
Pro￿ts ￿T 0,140625 0,150025
Welfare ￿T 0,234375 0,244375
39Table 5
Results for the Simultaneous Nash bargaining model

























































Results for the simultaneous right to manage model (￿ = 1=2;p = z = 1)
T = 1 T = 2 T = 3
Total employment LT 0.3750 0.3750 0.3927
Welfare ￿T 0.2343 0.2343 0.2385
Pro￿ts ￿T 0.1406 0.1406 0.1543
Utility UT 0.0937 0.0937 0.0841
Union i￿ s utility ui 0.0937 0.0468 0.028
Union i￿ s employment li 0.3750 0.1875 0.1309
Union i￿ s wage wi 0.25 0.25 0.2142
41Table 7
Results for the sequential Nash bargaining model (￿c independent of T)
T = 1 T = 2 T
UT
1
4￿(pz2 ￿ 4￿c) ￿1
4￿(￿ ￿ 2)](pz2 ￿ 4￿c) 1
4[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T](pz2 ￿ 4￿c)
￿T
1
4pz2(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿c 1
4pz2(￿1 + ￿)2 + ￿(2 ￿ ￿)￿c 1













4￿(pz2 ￿ 4￿c) 1
4￿(pz2 ￿ 4￿c) 1
4￿(pz2 ￿ 4￿c)
u2 ￿ ￿1
4￿(￿1 + ￿)(pz2 ￿ 4￿c) ￿1
4￿(￿1 + ￿)(pz2 ￿ 4￿c)
uT ￿ ￿ 1
4￿(1 ￿ ￿)T￿1(pz2 ￿ 4￿c)
42Table 8
Results for the Nash bargaining model (endogenous disagreement point ￿c
T)






































2 [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T￿1]￿T￿2
uT ￿ ￿ und
T [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T￿1]￿T￿2
where nd denotes the results obtained when ￿c
T = 0 (Table 2).
43Table 9
Results for the simultaneous Nash bargaining model
(endogenous disagreement point ￿c
T)























































where i : 1;2;:::;T.
44Table 10
Results for the simultaneous Nash bargaining model
(disagreement point independent of T)
T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T
UT
1

































































where i : 1;2;::;T.
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